Even if it produces no dramatic results, Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit to Baghdad Monday should be regarded as a positive step.
While no one expects the United States to take a leading role in helping Iraq out of its current crisis, the visit, which follows President Obama’s decision to send a token force of 300 men to Baghdad, indicates Washington’s abiding interest in what happens in Iraq.
Over the past two years, Kerry, who has visited the Middle East more than any other region in the world, has studiously avoided Iraq. He now realizes that, with or without its current troubles, Iraq cannot be ignored.
What happens in Iraq will affect the entire region and beyond, affecting the United States’ national-security interests for years to come.
Initially, the current crisis in Iraq took the Obama administration by surprise.
Both the president and Kerry believed they could treat Iraq as a nightmare best forgotten. Thus, when the jihadists erupted into Mosul almost two weeks ago, Washington had no contingency plan to cope with the effect.
The result was a number of faux pas, including the amazing suggestion that the United States and Iran work together to stabilize Iraq.
With the initial shock absorbed, the Obama administration is now in a position to develop something of a policy on Iraq. Such a policy, as Obama has amply indicated, is going to be a low-profile one.
The president has tied his own hands on the use of military force by announcing that he would not make any move in that direction without prior congressional and international approval.
Nor is he prepared to supply Iraq with any new category of weapons needed to deal with the jihadist insurgency.
Despite such self-imposed constraints, America is still capable of making a positive contribution to efforts to stabilize Iraq.
As Kerry indicated Monday, the United States could still play the role of mediator among various Iraqi factions whose cooperation is needed for the formation of a broad-based government to deal with the current crisis.
America should not insist on the departure of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki as a precondition. Maliki is past his sell-by date and must move on.
However, to ditch him now could appear like a victory for the jihadists. It could also send the message that governments are made and unmade not through elections and parliamentary procedures but with recourse to violence and terror.
Whatever accord is made on the shape of a new government, it must include at least an implicit pledge that Maliki will step down once the situation is brought under control.
The United States still has strong influence with some of the Kurdish factions whose support is crucial for forming a new government.
The US may also find sympathetic ears among the secular bloc led by former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, himself a Shiite but Âenjoying some support among Arab Sunnis as well.
But what could America offer in exchange for its demand to have a say in Iraqi politics?
To start with it could promise to work with Iraq at least until the end of the current crisis.
We now know that America had collected a mass of electronic and other data on the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or Da’aesh in Arabic.
Had that information been shared with the authorities in Baghdad, they might have been better able to prepare for dealing with the attacks launched against Mosul.
That the US is now offering full intelligence cooperation is a step in the right direction.
Next, while sticking to Obama’s decision not to provide Iraq with new categories of weapons, especially fixed-wing aircraft, the US could speed up the delivery of weapons already bought and paid for by Baghdad, notably Hellfire missiles.
Washington could also use quiet diplomacy to persuade some of its regional allies to assume a more active role in denying Da’esh funds and weapons originating in their territories.
Da’esh has now set up shop on the Jordanian frontier and controls a swath of territory close to the border with Saudi Arabia. Thus the policy of benign neglect towards Da’esh may begin to look like malign complicity.
Iraq does not need cash from America. However, allocating a symbolic sum from the fund just set up by Obama to fight international terrorism could be seen as a sign that Washington regards Iraq as an ally in the War on Terror.
As recent purges of the Iraqi army indicate, one of Iran’s top priorities is to weed out Iraqi officers trained by the US, including some who have graduated from US military academies.
Maliki has obliged, partly to please Tehran. The US should counter that by urging an end to the purges and offering greater training facilities inside and outside Iraq.
With or without US support, Da’esh will be contained and defeated if only because of its anachronistic posture.
However, it is in the United States’ national interest to remain an ally of Iraq as it uses its newly regained freedom to build a better future.