Opinion

Not really so smart

Futile: Sanctions hurt ordinary Iranians, like these shoppers in Tehran in January, but they won’t dissuade the regime from its nuclear course. (AFP/Getty Images)

Until a few weeks ago, the Obama administration’s declared goal on Iran was to prevent it from reaching the “threshold” in building nuclear weapons. These days, a new goal is emerging: to persuade Israel not to launch military strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities.

To that end, the administration is doing two things.

First, a bit of saber-rattling of its own: Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, who recently described war against Iran as “insane,” now says that “military options” are under study. The message to Israel: Do nothing — we’ll move when the time comes.

Second, putting the old dish of sanctions in the microwave. The media are full of “experts” speculating about the effectiveness of sanctions coupled with patience.

Barack Obama isn’t the first US president to use sanctions in lieu of a credible policy vis-à-vis the Khomeinist regime. Jimmy Carter started the tradition by imposing what he described as “retaliatory” sanctions — ignoring the fact that, by raiding the US embassy in Tehran and holding its staff hostage, the mullahs had committed an act of war.

George H.W. Bush continued the tradition by speaking of “proportionate” sanctions. Then Bill Clinton described his sanctions as “comprehensive,” even as he canceled many measures taken under Carter, Ronald Reagan and Bush Sr. He even apologized to the mullahs for unspecified “wrongs” that the United States supposedly did to them.

George W. Bush started by placing the Islamic Republic at the heart of an “Axis of Evil” and promising to impose “penalizing” sanctions — but wound up continuing Clinton’s policy of easing the pressure on Tehran.

Believing himself to be the brightest star in the galaxy of American presidents, Obama has spoken of “smart” sanctions. So far, these sanctions have led to a dramatic acceleration of Iran’s nuclear program.

When Obama entered the White House, Iran was enriching uranium to 3.5 percent purity; today, its enrichment level is more than 20 percent. Iran has unveiled its first home-made nuclear-fuel rod and is operating thousands of centrifuges, compared to around 800 in 2008.

Obama’s “smart” sanctions have failed — which is why the administration and its supporters are seeking new adjectives. One now reads of “escalating,” “crippling,” “wide-ranging” and “devastating” sanctions.

Think tanks in Washington and New York have had to dig deep into the thesaurus to find adjectives to describe the sanctions, which substitute for a real policy.

Sanctions, like diplomacy or war, are nothing but tools in the service of policy. When policy is muddled, no tool is effective.

Successive US administrations have failed in their analyses of the Iranian regime and in defining policy goals with clarity. They’ve hoped that the regime would change its behavior on issues including sponsoring international terrorism and stockpiling weapons of mass destruction. What they failed to understand is that the problem with the Khomeinist regime is not its behavior but its nature.

At times, when feeling the pinch from particular sanctions or even military action against it, the regime temporarily modifies its behavior to weather the storm. Once the storm passes, it reverts — indeed, it has no choice but to revert — to its natural behavior.

Thirty years ago, the regime didn’t have a nuclear program but was, nonetheless, a threat to regional peace. It sponsored terror, kidnapped Americans and Europeans, assassinated dissidents in Washington and London and oppressed the people of Iran. Every time it saw itself as threatened, it organized a tactical retreat but ended up returning to mischief-making on a grander scale.

As always since 1979, the real question about Iran is: change of behavior or regime change?

Behavior change is fool’s gold.

By promising “reforms,” the regime spent that gold whenever it was in a tight spot at home. Today, Iranians have learned that the regime can’t be reformed or behave contrary to its political DNA. It’s programmed to oppress the Iranian people and export terror.

Regardless of what adjective one uses, sanctions can be effective only as tools of a policy aimed at regime change. Policy options on Iran aren’t limited to military invasion or being led up the garden path by the mullahs.