Opinion

Iran’s eight dwarves

Would it make any difference? This is the question that Iranians face as their presidential election enters its final phase with a two-week campaign drawing to a close.

“Supreme Guide” Ali Khamenei wants a record turnout to renew his regime’s legitimacy. To that end, an impressive machine has been put in motion. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, now the power behind the throne, has mobilized over 100,000 people to “guide” people to more than 70,000 polling stations. The buzz in Khamenei’s entourage is that he’ll settle for nothing less than 90 percent turnout to recall the early, heady days of the revolution.

But regime opponents are also in high gear to persuade voters to go fishing on Election Day. Their boycott call has been amplified by part of the regime’s “loyal opposition” — figures and groups who pay deference to “the Revolution” while criticizing Khamenei’s leadership.

Beyond the “boycott” camp, many Iranians are contemplating another strategy: voting against the candidates closest to Khamenei.

That won’t be easy. Unable to define the exact role of a president in a system in which the “guide” has the final word on all issues, the eight candidates allowed by Khamenei to run have had a hard time projecting different profiles.

Who are these men? Though unknown to many Iranians, the eight are prominent figures in the narrow elite that has dominated Iran’s politics for three decades.

All are men, though women account for a majority of the population. Their average age is 25 years older than the average for the nation. All are government employees, most from the start of their careers.

All but two have been members of the Revolutionary Guards at different times; two are retired Guard generals. Three are related to one another and, through marriage, to Khamenei. Four others are related to various mullahs through blood links or marriage.

All but two have middle-class backgrounds, which let them obtain higher education, including in the United States and Britain, during the era of the shah. Indeed, three make much of the fact that they studied in the West; one has publicized his early days as a “hippie” in California.

All but one boast of having PhDs and being “doctors” of something or other. Even the single mullah among them likes to be described as “Aghay Doctor” (Mister Doctor) rather than by the religious title “Ayatollah.” The military men among the candidates also prefer the title “Doctor” to “General” — because religious and military titles have been discredited in many Iranians’ eyes.

Though employed by the government, all eight have business activities on the side, from ownership of hotels and construction firms to running news Web sites.

Two are subject to international arrest warrants for involvement in the assassination of Iranian exiles in Berlin and Paris. If elected, they might find it hard to travel abroad.

And all eight hail from the same ideological niche. This is a hodgepodge of old-style leftist clichés, anti-Americanism, Third Worldist complexes and messianic misunderstandings — all served with a pseudo-religious sauce. Saeed Jalili, the youngest candidate and generally regarded as Khamenei’s favorite, appears to be the most earnest when he professes “pure Khomeinism” — though that may be naiveté.

All claim that fixing the broken economy is a top priority, yet none has offered any economic program. There are two possible reasons for this: First, no one believes the data published by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s administration; second, no one dares offer reforms without a green light from the supreme leader.

All eight insist that there will be no change in Iran’s nuclear policy. Of course, it is the supreme leader, not the president, who has the final say.

None of the eight has shown oratory skills. The most boring is Jalili, with his long-winded, sleep-inducing speeches. Hassan Rouhani may be the next worst (though mullahs are usually decent speakers): His efforts to imitate political speeches he heard in England and Scotland yield a mullah trying to sound like Margaret Thatcher.

The only surprise so far has come from Mohsen Rezai, who became a general and commander of the Revolutionary Guard at 27, during the Iran-Iraq War. A fixture of Iranian presidential contests after having stood three times before, largely unnoticed, he’s caused some surprise this time by raising the issue of Iran’s ethnic and religious minorities and highlighting his humble social backgrounds.

But he’s unlikely to do any better this time. All the interest turns on the battle over turnout and the success of candidates believed to be closest to Khamenei.