With the battle lines in Iraq’s Sunni provinces more or less stabilized, the war-torn nation’s political elite have a fresh chance to walk from the edge of the precipice.
Several developments leave a small window of opportunity for saving the Iraqi state from meltdown.
First: The Kurds have agreed that a referendum on their eventual independence from Iraq should ultimately be pursued through negotiations with the central government.
Though they’re boycotting the sessions of the interim Cabinet headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the Kurdish parties have indicated their readiness to join a new coalition government in Baghdad.
Second: Two key Shiite blocs in the newly elected parliament have agreed on a single candidate to replace al-Maliki as prime minister — Ahmad Chalabi, the bête-noire of the US media establishment.
His faction, the Iraqi National Congress, has emerged as the second choice of larger Shiite blocs led by Ammar al-Hakim and Muqtada al-Sadr.
Together, the three blocs account for almost 40 percent of the seats in parliament. If backed by Kurds and some Sunnis, they could form a new government led by Chalabi. (Maliki’s faction, the State of Law, controls about a quarter of the seats.)
Third: We’re getting a clearer picture of the actual balance of forces in the three Sunni provinces where insurgents have seized a number of towns and villages, including Mosul, Iraq’s No. 3 city.
That picture reveals the so-called Islamic State (or Da’esh) group as just one of several players. At least four other groups, each boasting armed wings, are present.
One is Ansar al-Islam (Victors of Islam), an armed outfit originally financed by the oil-rich Arab allies of the United States.
Another uses the label of al-Naqshabandiyah, a centuries-old Sufi movement with tentacles stretching as far as Turkey, Iran and Central Asia.
That movement, too, has always had good relations with the United States and played a part in helping calm down the Sunni revolt in 2006-7 through its armed wing known as Army of Men.
A third group consists of tens of thousands of former officers of Saddam Hussein’s army and security agencies and cadres of his Ba’ath Party.
Finally, we have the Military Tribal Council, which can field as many as 40,000 armed men. Initially set up by Gen. David Petraeus during the US “surge” operations, the council brings together 83 Arab Sunni tribes.
The success of the “surge” was largely due to efforts by US generals and diplomats to foster a national consensus among rival Iraqi factions that regarded each other with suspicion and hostility, even hatred.
That consensus was expressed in the 18-Point National Accord that reassured the Shiites and Kurds while addressing the grievances of the Arab Sunnis, who had ruled Iraq since 1921.
But a US commitment and continued presence were regarded as guarantees the benchmarks of the accord would be respected, and President Obama’s decision to abandon Iraq in a hurry ended those guarantees.
Maliki seized the chance to ignore the accord and pursue an increasingly sectarian strategy.
Asserting his position as the key player in Iraqi politics, he persuaded Iran to abandon its erstwhile Shiite allies, the Hakim and Sadr families, and support his increasingly personal rule.
Unwilling to get militarily involved in Iraq, Washington should now heighten its diplomatic profile. That would require the appointment of a special emissary to revive US contacts across Iraq, notably in Sunni provinces, in the context of support for the revival of the National Accord.
The United States could also use its influence with Iraq’s neighbors (notably Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia) to isolate the more extremist groups, thus creating space for more moderate Sunni outfits to return to the fore.
On the Shiite and Kurdish fronts, Washington should throw its support behind any candidate who can win majority support in the new parliament.
Iraq’s new democracy, though fragile, still offers ample scope for dealing with its current crisis. America should be there to offer a helping hand.