Opinion

America: Keep your enemies closer

Like FDR making a deal with Stalin, or Nixon reaching out to China, Americans are going to have to get used to the unthinkable — a treaty with Iran.

So argues GEORGE FRIEDMAN, founder and CEO of the independent intelligence firm Stratfor — sometimes called the private CIA — in his new book “The Next Decade” (Doubleday). In his previous book, “The Next 100 Years,” Friedman made the case for an American century, saying that no country truly threatens the United States’ economic or military dominance for decades.

But in the next 10 years, how we handle that empire — and we are an empire, he insists — we must keep our friends close, but our enemies much closer. That means reaching agreements with Iran and Pakistan to keep them from causing trouble, even if their regimes do not change.

Friedman is a strategist, meaning his primary concern is in preventing wars and the emergence of any power that would challenge the United States — including democratic states like India. The coming decade will be a time of playing nations off one another, from Iran and Saudi Arabia to China and Japan. He says that this is the best solution, but it’s also the most logical one. It’s either that or more conflict.

“Maintaining the balance of power should be as fundamental to American foreign policy as the Bill of Rights is to domestic policy,” Friedman writes. “The United States should enter a war in the Eastern Hemisphere only in the direst of circumstances, when an onerous power threatens to overtake vast territory and no one who can resist it is left.”

Here’s how Friedman sees the major players in the coming decade:

RUSSIA-GERMANY-POLAND: Russia’s goal will be to separate Europe — primarily Germany — from the United States. Germany already is hugely dependent on Russia for energy and disillusioned with the NATO alliance over Afghanistan and Iraq; it may be amenable to closer relations. The US should not directly challenge Russia, Friedman advises, instead doing what it can to strengthen economies and relations with nations Hungary, Slovakia and Turkey. It should forget about helping Georgia (it’s a drain on resources with little benefit) and instead court Azerbaijan as a source of oil and a platform for American operations. Most importantly, “The United States must work to make Poland what Germany was in the 1950s,” as we can’t expect Germany to fall into lockstep with our foreign priorities.

“In all this maneuvering, the point is first to avoid a war and second to limit a relationship between Russia and Germany that could, in succeeding decades, create a power that could challenge American hegemony,” Friedman says.

AFRICA: Friedman’s pragmatic — as he admits, “harsh” — conclusion is that the US does not need Africa, and that nothing can be done to stop wars there since the national boundaries drawn by colonial powers were arbitrary. Eventually, national identities will be forged by the wars happening there, in which America should not involve itself. As for aid, “it cannot possibility have any lasting impact, because it does not address the fundamental problem of the irrationality of African borders.” But the US should give anyway, since it would “serve the purpose of enhancing America’s image. In a decade in which the United States will need to spend hundreds of billions of dollars a year on defense, spending $10 billion or $20 billion on aid to Africa would be a proportional and reasonable attempt to buy admiration.”

MEXICO: Absent a colossal mistake by the cartels, nothing will change between the US and Mexico, Friedman says. There’s a simple way to confront illegal immigration — institute a national identity card and deport anyone without it. “This is highly unlikely to be employed, in part because many of the people most opposed to illegal immigration also have a deep mistrust of the federal government.” Also because the segment of society that benefits most from low-cost workers are more influential than the segment harmed by it. The result: “Hypocrisy,” Friedman says, with every president pledging to do something about immigration and then doing nothing. The cartels will eventually reach a stable peace, or a single group will wipe all the others out. The US will not risk an all-out war by sending troops into Mexico, so long as no cartel kills non-members on this side of the border — something they work hard not to do.

ISRAEL: In a prediction sure to cause waves, Friedman suggests that we will abandon all efforts at negotiating a peace. “The United States should quietly adopt a policy of disengagement from Israel, which would appear to mean simply accepting the current imbalance of power.” Quietly, so as not to create domestic political problems or to embolden Israel’s enemies. But disengage we must, since, “While settlement in the West Bank may be a fundamental national interest to Israel, it is of no interest to the United States.” Further, “Israel is in no danger of falling and does not depend on the United States to survive. That is in the past. The United States needs distance. It will take it.”

IRAN: The Iraq War was a mistake, taking out an important counterbalance to Iranian power. Iran’s greatest strategic asset is its ability to strike at the Strait of Hormuz, through which 45% of the world’s oil is shipped. So what is America’s best option? A treaty. “These countries despise each other. Neither can easily destroy the other, and, truth be told, they have some interests in common. In simple terms, the American president, in order to achieve his strategic goals, must seek accommodation with Iran.” Friedman admits President Obama would have a difficult time selling this deal — “his standing would be enhanced more with an air strike than by a cynical deal” — but argues it is the best option. America will get more stability in the region, a Shiite ally against Sunni terrorism and no nukes. The Iranian regime would get a guarantee the US won’t invade; in essence, power. It puts more pressure on Saudi Arabia, birthplace of many Islamic radicals, and it separates US foreign policy from Israel. Like China, this is not an alliance of long-term friendship, but of convenience.

“I am arguing that this is a preferred policy option given the circumstances,” Friedman says. “But I am also arguing that this is the most logical outcome. The alternatives are unacceptable to both sides; there is too much risk.”

CHINA: Fears of Chinese dominance are overstated, Friedman says. About 80% of China lives in conditions that compare with the poverty of sub-Saharan Africa, including 600 million who live in households that subsist on less than $3 a day. Any hiccup in economic growth, even minor, and the nation will face huge amounts of instability. The US should be more worried about China fragmenting, and should be interested in it keeping its engine going. Neither China or Japan will emerge as a great power in this decade, and the US should maintain good relations with both in hopes of keeping a balance that requires little American action.

INDIA: Though it is a democratic ally, America doesn’t have an interest in seeing India become a regional military power, Friedman says. “The cheapest way to accomplish this and preempt a long-range problem is for the United States to support a stronger Pakistan, thus keeping India’s security planners focused on the land and not the sea.” Friedman sees US-India relations deteriorating over the next 10 years.