Opinion

Team Obama’s latest plan to boost Assad

Anxious to keep their diplomatic fudge-orama running, President Obama and his secretary of state, John Kerry, are pressing ahead with maneuvers for yet another conference on Syria in Geneva next month.

The problem is that the conference — a Russian trick to keep the Ba’athist despot Bashar al-Assad in power — can only prolong the Syrian tragedy, while further damaging the United States’ already diminished standing in the Middle East.

The Obama-Kerry tandem has already made several concessions in exchange for a Russian promise to attend the conference. Last month, the US halted the meager aid, labeled “nonlethal,” it provided for anti-Assad rebels. Washington even exerted pressure on European allies to do the same, so far succeeding with the British, who have also halted their aid to Syrian freedom fighters. Worse still, the Obama administration has provoked a public rift with regional allies such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, whose support is crucial for any settlement of the Syrian conflict.

Thus when Kerry flies to Geneva for another photo-op, he would represent a US that has abandoned all its regional allies. At the same time, the US will not be able to count on any of the three broad camps that together represent the anti-Assad coalition. The truth is that no one in Syria trusts the US these days. It seems increasingly unlikely that any of the major rebel groups will even go to Geneva.

In contrast, Russia would attend Geneva at the head of a united alliance that includes the mullahs of Tehran, Assad and his gang in Damascus and a string of anti-American personalities and groups in Lebanon, Iraq and the Palestinian territories. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov would have the authority to speak on behalf of his camp. Kerry will not be able to make the same claim on behalf of his camp because he has none.

Not surprisingly, Moscow has been trying to dictate the agenda for Geneva. Lavrov says the gathering will work on a “transition formula.” The trouble is that he also insists that the shape of any transition and the identity of those who would lead it depends on “the Syrian government.” Since Assad has already stated that he must lead whatever transition is agreed upon, the Lavrov formula would mean “transition from Assad to Assad.”

In that context, Kerry could prove useful by granting a transition led by Assad a measure of big-power recognition, if not legitimacy. Russia would also need the US to push a resolution through the United Nations Security Council to approve the diplomatic swindle prepared in Geneva.

While the Russians have a very clear idea of what they want in Geneva, the Americans lack a strategy, apart from filling Kerry’s photo albums and nurturing his dream of a Nobel Peace Prize.

It is, of course, too late for the US to develop a policy on Syria before Geneva. Thus, Obama and Kerry are left with two options: play the role scripted for them by Vladimir Putin, or scrap the whole sinister plan.

A third option may also be available, however, provided that Obama and Kerry take their task of shaping the foreign policy of a major democratic power a bit more seriously. In that option, they would insist that the planned Geneva conference focuses on two points:

  •  Implementing the accords made in the first Geneva conference on Syria, notably an end to indiscriminate bombing of urban areas by Assad’s Russian-made air craft.
  •  Mobilizing a major international effort, led by the UN, to ferry aid to the Syrian people. The UN has already declared Syria to be the biggest humanitarian challenge the world faces. Almost 10 million people, nearly half the population, are either refugees or displaced inside Syria.

The US could assume leadership in mobilizing the resources needed to cope with this human tragedy, forcing the Russians to decide whether they wish to continue deepening the tragedy or stop it.

Kerry should tell Lavrov that the US will not allow itself to be used as a rubber stamp for a “transition from Assad to Assad” scheme.

A clear American position, not one geared to a Russian scheme, might help restore some of the credibility the US has lost among allies in the region and within the broad coalition of anti-Assad forces inside Syria.