A plot by the Muslim Brotherhood to seize power in Kuwait through street politics appears to have been defeated — at least for now. On Saturday, Kuwait managed to hold a general election in the teeth of the Brotherhood’s call for a total boycott.
True, the turnout, around 40 percent, was the lowest in a decade. But the results reflect the oil-rich country’s ethnic, religious and political diversity.
Despite the boycott, the Brotherhood won four seats, as several prominent figures refused to toe the party line. Shiites, some 30 percent of the population, more than doubled their share of seats, from seven to 15. The new 50-seat parliament will have three women members, compared to none in the previous one.
A coalition of reformists and moderate Islamists has secured a majority, paving the way for a revision of the constitution to increase the powers of the parliament.
The United States has a national interest in a stable and democratic Kuwait. Since the American withdrawal from Saudi Arabia and Iraq, Kuwait has emerged as the principal base for US forces in the Persian Gulf.
Since the country’s independence in 1960, Kuwaiti politics have been something of a curiosity in the Arab world — a mixture of electoral politics on the one hand and, on the other, traditional deals between the ruling Al Sabah family and its allies in tribal and merchant clans. For decades, the model proved flexible enough to weather numerous storms, including Iraqi invasions in 1960 and 1990.
Kuwait developed consensual politics in the 19th century, long before the oil bonanza. Timid but important steps toward broadening the base of decision-making came even before independence. The emergence of political, social and cultural clubs, the expansion of relatively free media and creative tension between parliament and government helped define a Kuwaiti brand of politics.
The country has differed from most other Arab countries in other ways. It has never had an opposition in exile, because dissidents are able to express their views at home, in the media and/or the parliament. Nor has Kuwait earned notoriety for imprisoning dissidents.
But Hadas, the Kuwaiti branch of the Brotherhood, is trying to inject a dose of insurrectionary tactics into the country’s politics.
Hadas knows that Kuwait’s demographic mix wouldn’t allow it to secure the electoral victory needed for radical Islamization. There is no configuration under which Hadas could secure a straight majority.
Wisdom dictates that Hadas temper its lust for power. Indeed, the Brotherhood throughout the region should not try to bite off more than it can chew.
A decade ago, Sudanese politician Hassan al-Turabi spoke of his dream of Islamists capturing Kuwait and using its oil wealth to advance global jihad. That dream may still live in some heads in Kuwait and elsewhere.
Certainly, it’s not difficult to play heroics in Kuwait, because you can be sure that, whatever you do in politics, nothing really bad will happen to you or your family. But this is why there is no need for street politics in Kuwait.
Yet reform would be prudent. The parliament has often been a kind of political souk, with members blackmailing ministers, and at times the whole Cabinet, and the government trying to advance its agenda by bribing parliamentarians.
The predominance of individual, clannish and sectarian interests has slowed down the emergence of a sense of common interest. That, in turn, has hampered decision-making.
The electoral system in place is far from flawless, and the absence of political parties encourages sectarianism.
And a great deal of corruption is built into the system. Not long ago, I was amazed to hear parliamentarians passionately demanding the cancellation of all debts up to a certain level — a move that could have bankrupted all Kuwaiti banks.
Cleaning the stables remains a major task.
Kuwait also faces a tricky succession problem: The emir, Sheik Sabah Ahmad Al-Jaber, is in his 80s — yet the family for the first time seems unable to promote a credible line of succession.
Kuwait’s national security, even survival, depends (at least in part) on maintaining a consensual system in which basic freedoms are guaranteed. The country must remain vigilant against rapacious neighbors close and far.
In a moment of danger, a Kuwait under an obscurantist system would be unable to call on Western democracies for rescue — as in 1990, when Saddam Hussein’s armies annexed the emirate.