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Stuxnet virus might have improved Iran’s nuclear capabilities: report

When the Stuxnet computer virus attacked Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities in 2010, it was widely acknowledged to be the most successful cyber attack of all time.

Unfortunately, new research shows that the Stuxnet virus was not only unsuccessful, it might have actually improved Iran’s ability to make nuclear weapons, according to a new report

The stunning claim comes from a report published in a British academic journal which claims that Stuxnet had no discernible effect on Iran’s ability to enrich uranium — which can be used as fuel in a nuclear weapon — and that it might have actually improved Iran’s nuclear capabilities by exposing vulnerabilities that the regime might not have found for years.

The Stuxnet computer virus attacked Iran in a series of digital attacks in 2009 and 2010, and it was believed at the time that a number of centrifuges used to enrich uranium at Iran’s facility at Natanz were severely damaged during the attack, setting back production by two years.

Supporting this version of events, the Internation Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said that 1,000 centrifuges were decommissioned and replaced in late 2009 or early 2010.

Although never officially acknowledged, anonymous officials told that New York Times that the United States and Israel were involved in the Stuxnet attack on Iran’s centrifuges.

While politicians in the United States and Israel have claimed that Stuxnet was a major success, Ivanka Barzashka, the author of the new report, studied data from the IAEA and found their data was not proof that the attack succeeded. In fact, the number of centrifuges operating at Natanz has been “steadily growing” since August 2010.

The increase implies that, at best, Stuxnet had no lasting effect on Iran, and at worst might have made the Iranians even savvier makers of nukes.

Backing up Barzashak’s position is the fact that before the attack ,Iran was enriching uranium to 3.5 percent, and after the attack it began enriching uranium to 20 percent. For a bomb, Iran will need to enrich uranium to about 90 percent.

“Uranium-enrichment capacity grew during the time that Stuxnet was said to have been destroying Iranian centrifuges,” Barzashak writes. “Iran produced more enriched uranium, more efficiently: the entire plant’s separative capacity per day increased.

“The malware — if it did in fact infiltrate Natanz — has made the Iranians more cautious about protecting their nuclear facilities,” Barzashka writes.

Furthermore, “Iran’s uranium-enrichment capacity increased and, consequently, so did its nuclear-weapons potential.”

“Stuxnet was of net benefit to Iran if, indeed, its government wants to build a bomb or increase its nuclear-weapons potential,” Barzashka warns.

For a detailed explanation of how Stuxnet worked, see the video below:

Stuxnet: Anatomy of a Computer Virus from Patrick Clair on Vimeo.