An uncertain chapter opened in Iraq this week, as British forces officially ceded control of Iraq’s oil-rich southern province of Basra to the country’s fledgling security services.
What comes next is unclear, but the handover is certainly evidence that – even in Iraq – time marches on.
The move formalizes the situation on the ground since September, when British forces retreated to the outskirts of the province’s major city. By spring, only 2,500 British troops will remain in all of Iraq, almost exclusively in a support and training role.
In important ways, this is a good sign.
As Gen. David Petraeus said, the transition “represents the most recent step toward a future of improved security, self-reliance and increased prosperity.” Iraqi forces, he said, “have demonstrated their readiness” to take charge.
Long-term success in Iraq will depend on Iraqis assuming responsibility for their own country at some point. The province of Basra – home to Iraq’s second-largest city (also called Basra), its only major port and much of its oil reserves – could be a key early test of how ready they are.
To be sure, Iraqi control in Basra is risky. The Shia-dominated region has never experienced Baghdad’s level of sectarian violence, but it’s a battleground for control between rival Shia militias – which many fear have already infiltrated the Iraqi security forces.
British commander Maj. Gen. Graham Binns has obliquely acknowledged that US forces may need to intervene if the situation deteriorates – and a top American commander publicly questioned whether Iraqi forces alone would be able to prevent Iran from meddling in the province.
The British, for their part, have for some time felt that their obligations to the US-led Coalition – and to the Iraqi people – have been winding down.
Thus, even as Petraeus’ troop surge successfully responded to increasing violence in Baghdad and surrounding provinces by upping America’s ante and shifting to a new, more engaged strategy, the British in the south pursued a strategy of increasing disengagement.
This is no slur against Britain, which for more than six years has been America’s most faithful ally in the War on Terror, and which continues to maintain a large and active force in Afghanistan.
Alas, America – as the leader of the Coalition – can’t follow suit anytime soon. Iraq’s emergence as a secure and independent nation will be a long process, sure to be punctuated by periods of increased violence.
Again, such violence may well erupt in Basra with the Brits gone.
But the Iraqis will have their chance to step up. If they’re to prevail and, ultimately, defeat terror – as they did against al Qaeda in Baghdad, Anbar province and elsewhere – they’ll need not only America’s help, but its commitment that such support will be forthcoming . . . until it’s no longer necessary at all.