President Obama cited technical fac tors yesterday that might, arguably, justify his scrapping of a planned European shield against Iranian missiles. But as political strategy, there’s just one way to describe his move: It’s a major US setback.
Polish and Czech officials, who’d been promised the shield by then-President Bush, tried to mask their disappointment. “It’s not good,” said former Polish President Lech Walesa. Longtime proponents of the system, like Sen. John McCain, called the shift “severely misguided.”
By contrast, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev was thrilled, calling it a “responsible move.” As were such Obama allies in Congress as House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, who labeled it “brilliant.”
Now, it’s true that many military experts, including regular Post contributor Ralph Peters, have had technical concerns about the program. Indeed, the shift — to a new emphasis on stopping short- and medium-range missiles — was backed by Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
And Obama insisted that his decision, first reported by The Wall Street Journal, was based on “updated” intelligence assessments of Iran’s missile programs.
But US intelligence reports haven’t exactly proved prescient in the past. In fact, a draft International Atomic Energy Agency report reportedly says that Iran has “sufficient information” to build a nuclear device and is well on the way toward developing a missile system capable of carrying it.
Worse, Obama’s decision is a huge diplomatic victory for Medvedev and Vladimir Putin — who swore from the outset that they wouldn’t permit such a system in Eastern Europe.
It’s a major sellout of two key allies who’ve done everything America’s asked of them, often at great political cost.
Ironically, Obama’s announcement came on the 70th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland at the start of World War II — an event that underscores Warsaw’s longstanding fear of aggression from the east.
Moreover, Obama’s cave-in to Putin & Co. might make sense if it were part of a quid pro quo — namely, a firm Russian commitment to take a harder line against Iran’s nuclear ambitions. But Moscow has signaled that fresh sanctions against Iran would be “a serious mistake.”
In the end, this was a test by Russia of Washington’s diplomatic will — and Washington buckled.
And the long-term diplomatic damage — which seems to have bought America nothing in return — may more than offset whatever military gains are realized.