Everyone in Egypt agrees on this much: The “transition” has already started.
But they don’t agree on what “transition” means — or on whether it will be dictated by the “street” or choreographed by a nervous regime.
Yesterday, new Vice President Omar Suleiman announced that transition talks had begun between the governing National Democratic Party and “the opposition.” He also described the protesters’ demands as legitimate and promised “much reform” and a referendum.
The subtext: Suleiman is now in charge, and President Hosni Mubarak should be allowed to fade away “with dignity.”
Yet those who seek regime change won’t be satisfied with a switch from President Mubarak to President Suleiman. They want to bring down the whole edifice built since the military seized power in 1952. They’ve promised a mass demonstration today with the aim of storming the presidential palace.
That is one of two clear camps on “transition.” The other wants change within the regime.
In the first camp, we find dozens of small groups bringing together young, often well-educated, people who dream of a modern society based on freedom and enterprise. They are often referred to as the Facebook Movement. The best known, the April 6 Movement and the January 25 Coalition, played a key role in organizing the first demonstrations that forced Mubarak to announce his intention to retire in September.
Also supporting regime change is a number of parties — notably Ayman al-Nur’s al-Ghad (Tomorrow), the Egyptian Communist Party, the Kifayah (Enough!), led by George Ishaq, and the Karamah (Dignity), led by Hamad bin Sabahi.
On the fringes of this camp, we find terrorist Islamist groups, notably Gamaa al-Islamiyah, and at least one of the Muslim Brotherhood’s many factions, led by Yussuf al-Qaradawi.
Thus, the regime-change camp is a motley crew of disparate forces with conflicting interests and ideologies.
In the second camp, we find the regime’s political wing and the various security services. It is these elements that are organizing counterdemonstrations that have already claimed several lives in Cairo. The Republican Guard, a parallel army dedicated to the president, provides the backbone of this camp.
However, this camp is just as full of paradoxes.
Here, we also find official and semi-official parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood and Wafd (Delegation) — which fear that complete regime change might unleash forces with no time for the Brotherhood’s anachronistic Islamism or Wafd’s dusty conservatism.
Watching and waiting is the powerful military, a state within the state — which is tempted by regime change if that means no change in its own status within any configuration and by change within the regime if that means more power for itself.
So far, the military’s top man, Gen. Sami Annan, has tried to put his chips on both numbers.
His “quiet advice” was a key factor in persuading Mubarak to announce his retirement. And he was the man behind the decision to let troops fraternize with demonstrators. Yet Gen. Annan also gave the green light for the entry of pro-Mubarak street fighters on the stage.
Two clocks have begun ticking in Egypt. One is the clock of more demonstrations, the other that of talks between the NDP and some opposition parties.
The regime hopes that the talks will divide the opposition, so that the demonstrations peter out. That, in turn, could allow a “dignified departure” for Mubarak. Mubarak is a retired general, and his humiliation would mean an insult to the military as a whole.
According to Munir Ibrahim, an NDP spokesman, the talks should identify “issues and establish a road map for change” so as “to hold the next presidential elections under the best conditions.”
But opposition parties want straight constitutional reform and a referendum. They demand a lifting of the ban on all parties and repeal of the rule under which candidates must be preapproved by the security services.
And they want an immediate end to the 30-year-old state of emergency, which gives the police and security services extra-judicial powers of detention.
Regime change — or change within the regime?
In Egypt today, that is the question.