Two months after Libyans started demonstrating against Col. Moammar Kha dafy’s regime, the crisis they triggered has reached a fork in the road.
At first, it was a popular uprising, modeled on the events that led to the fall of dictators in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt.
Khadafy, however, unlike his Tunisian and Egyptian counterparts, wasn’t prepared to head for the exit. And the fact that the United Nations’ Security Council has ordered an investigation of his regime on charges of crimes against humanity has made a quiet exit more problematic.
By mobilizing elements of his tribes and army, Khadafy tried to transform the popular uprising into a civil war. When that failed, he fomented a conventional war, aimed at recapturing lost territory, with the help of mercenaries from Chad and Niger.
By last week, the colonel’s new strategy clearly also had failed. Now, he’s going for guerrilla warfare, including the use of snipers to kill civilians at random to terrorize the population into submission. (The Syrian regime is using the same tactic.)
Back to the fork of the road: One path leads to a quick end to the crisis, the other to months of turmoil that could transform Libya into another nonstate territory and breeding ground for terrorism and piracy. (The famous medieval pirate Kheireddin Barbarosa operated from bases in what is now Libya.)
Khadafy now controls little beyond parts of the capital and perhaps the port city of Sirte. His opponents control a chunk of territory from Benghazi to the Egyptian border, plus Misrata in the west. That still leaves almost 80 percent of Libya’s vast territory without any credible authority.
The world’s democracies could shorten the crisis and prevent Libya’s collapse by doing three things:
First, they should recognize the National Transition Council, set up by 12 Libyan opposition groups as the de facto provisional government. Several countries, including France and Italy, have already done so. Britain is even opening what amounts to a de facto embassy in Benghazi.
Yet some countries, including Greece, still regard Khadafy as the legitimate ruler of Libya. Greek sources tell me that Athens won’t switch sides until Washington clarifies its position.
A clear signal from Washington would persuade many countries to abandon Khadafy. That, in turn, could speed up internal dissension and the regime’s ultimate collapse. I have good information that at least five senior Khadafy officials are prepared to defect the moment America establishes formal ties with the council in Benghazi.
Second, the democracies should enlarge the no-fly-zone mission, now run by NATO, to include knocking out the mercenaries’ logistical networks and heavy weapons’ stores.
The UN-sponsored operations reached their peak 10 days ago and have been on a descending curve ever since. It seems that NATO is reluctant to make full use of the resources at its disposal to defang the colonel. NATO’s hesitancy, described by its officials as prudence or caution, could prolong the conflict at the cost of many more lives.
The anti-Khadafy forces have become better organized and have launched a credible program to train the freedom fighters. With help from France and Britain, they’re also obtaining some weapons they need. America could help by providing weapons that other allies can’t now supply. The United States’ unique lift-up capacity could also help speed the supply of arms to the freedom fighters.
Finally, the democracies should help the council in Benghazi resume Libya’s oil exports, helping it secure the financial resources for the fight. Such a move would also help prevent further hikes in the global price of oil.
The first tanker seeking to transport oil from the freed parts of Libya reached Tobruk on Tuesday. But, here, too, a clearer signal from Washington that it wants the pro-democracy forces to win would help encourage other oil companies to resume trade with council-held territories.
The United States could still play a key role in the crisis — either by staying aloof or by giving the freedom fighters a hand. Washington’s current policy of ambiguous absence is the worst of both worlds for America and for Libya.