Opinion

Israel’s stake in Egypt

While Americans of all po litical stripes look at Egypt’s future with a mix ture of hope and trepidation, Israelis almost uniformly agree: No good can come of this.

Yesterday’ bloody confrontations only add to the worries that the once Gandhi-like revolt will spin out of control — increasing chances that some radical regime will take power.

But even a milder resolution, Israelis increasingly fear, will imperil the peace treaty they signed in 1979 with an undemocratic ruler, Anwar Sadat. And will the king of Jordan, another peaceful but undemocratic neighbor, survive?

Nevertheless, some of President Obama’s closest allies are urging him to use this uncertain moment (Arab spring?) to push Israel to sign a grand treaty with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas — another aging and undemocratic leader whose hold on power is extremely precarious.

No, Israelis don’t want to deny the residents of Cairo and Alexandria the kind of freedoms they enjoy. But their experience to date has taught them to be skeptical about instant democracy in the neighborhood.

In 1979, Israel lost its closest regional ally, after America warned the shah against shooting at freedom-seeking street demonstrators in Tehran. Iran emerged not as a democracy, but as an oppressive, Islamic regime. In 2006, America pushed for Palestinian elections — and victorious Hamas celebrated by viciously murdering all political rivals in Gaza. And last month Hezbollah used Lebanon’s Constitution to topple a pro-Western government — though it’s fair to ask what kind of democracy it is, when one party is armed to the teeth and often shows that it’s willing to use its weapons against all others.

The common theme in these failed experiments in democracy is anti-Semitic rhetoric, threats against Israel and the occasional shooting war.

So yes, Israelis respect new media. Hell, they invented the instant-messaging technology. But excuse them when they don’t quite see a Cairo “Twitter revolution” (only 21 percent of Egyptians even have access to the Internet, versus 70 percent-plus in America and Israel) and tune their ears instead to demonstrators cursing President Hosni Mubarak by calling him a Zionist collaborator.

They (and others in the region) also can’t help but wonder why President Obama, who sat on his hands two years ago when pro-democracy crowds in Tehran threatened the mullahs’ regime, now jumps to side with the Cairo demonstrators. And why did the administration yesterday threaten only the Mubarak side with prosecution over its role in the street violence, even as it was unclear which side instigated it, and which was trying to maintain some law and order?

Mubarak’s relations with Israel are complex. Even after signing peace in 1979, Egypt kept hammering the anti-Israel message to its citizens through state-run media. To gain anti-Zionist street creds, Cairo also led a diplomatic assault on Israel (and America) in such international institutions as the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency. State-sanctioned religious leaders, like top imam Yusuf al-Qaradawi, spewed odious anti-Semitic propaganda to the masses.

At the same time, Mubarak and his trusted ally Omar Suleiman (now vice president) cooperated with Israel on such essential tasks as blocking arms deliveries to Hamas in Gaza, allowing Jerusalem to trust its southern neighbor more than any other regional ally.

Now, even if the Muslim Brotherhood fails to outright seize power, whatever emerges as Egypt’s new government will likely bow to street sentiments, which remain decisively anti-Israel, and end such cooperation. So even if Cairo doesn’t tear up the peace treaty, Israel has to reorient itself toward brand-new regional realities.

Some Israelis have wondered for years why Egypt is building a huge army with impressive offensive capabilities, even though it has no serious enemies. Their warnings that it would one day target Israel no longer sound paranoid.

Although Arab turmoil reinforces Israel’s unique regional status as a stable democracy, some foreign-policy eggheads are bound to calculate now that sacrificing its interests is a small price to pay for bonding with the emerging regional powers. Obama would do much better listening to Israeli anxieties instead, and stress to everyone in the region that Washington’s alliance with Jerusalem is stronger than ever. beavni@gmail.com