The Syrian uprising started more than 16 months ago as a spontaneous peaceful protest by around 200 people in Dera’a, a medium-sized city on the Jordanian border.
Within weeks, the number had risen to 200,000 nationwide, and then to 2 million. The rest, as the saying goes, is history.
As more Syrians shed their fear, the need for organized action became more urgent. And when President Bashar al-Assad pushed his death machine into high gear, people started looking for ways of creating armed self-defense units.
With every month, the movement gained a new layer of support. But, each additional layer also altered the original identity of the movement as a spontaneous popular revolt.
The first to join the uprising was the Muslim Brotherhood. Soon, they were joined by several parties of the left that the Assads, father and son, had failed to totally uproot. Then came pan-Arab Nasserists followed by the more radical Islamists collectively known as Salafis. Next to join the marches were disgruntled elements of the ruling Ba’ath Party. As the regime’s pillars trembled even some top figures of the army, the secret service and bureaucracy rushed to join the revolution.
Originally an Arab-Sunni revolt, the uprising evolved into a truly national one, attracting first the Kurdish minority, then the Druze.
In the past few weeks it has also won support from Christians and, more surprisingly perhaps, from the Alawite ruling minority.
What has emerged is a composite identity that reflects Syria’s numerous ethnic, religious, sectarian and ideological contradictions with all the negative and positive energies they generate. Unless a way is found to channel those energies towards a path to democratization, Assad’s fall, now seemingly inevitable, could trigger years of sectarian conflicts.
What is to be done?
First, we need a credible outside power to help chaperone the transition.
The United Nations could have played that role. But it was scripted out by Russian and Chinese vetoes, at least for the time being. France, England, Saudi Arabia and Turkey all lack the clout or come with too much baggage.
Whether one likes it or not, the only power capable of playing a determining role is the United States, provided it drops the “leading-from-behind” slogan.
Under its leadership, the US could harmonize the policies of the European Union, Turkey and the Arab bloc which, in addition to Saudi Arabia, now includes Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and the oil states of the Persian Gulf. That would make sure that, in the crucial months ahead, all those who wish to see the back of Assad would be pulling in the same direction.
Unless the US takes the lead, the various regional players would have an open field to promote their own allies and clients. The Turkish government, a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, would throw its weight behind the Syrian branch of the movement supported by the Egyptian Brotherhood. The Saudis and the Qataris would invest in their Salafi clients, as they did in Egypt. Iran would try to play the Alawite and Ismaili Shi’ite cards. France is suspected of secretly promoting the interests of the Christians.
In other words, the US is the only major player without a hidden agenda. The fact that the US withdrew from Iraq without demanding any permanent bases or military presence is cited by many Syrians as a sign that America is more serious about democratization than its enemies claim.
Politically, the Syrian National Council may have reached the limits of its potential.
Consisting largely of exiles that acted as megaphones for the voiceless inside Syria, the SNC must be re-organized to reflect the emerging leadership inside the country. Today, the uprising controls more than 100 towns and parts of many cities, including Damascus and Aleppo, and is developing a local leadership structure.
Depending almost exclusively on exiles, the mistake made in Afghanistan and Iraq should not be repeated in Syria.
Also urgently needed is the reunification of the disparate military commands across the country.
The Free Syrian Army is no longer the only group fighting Assad. There are new elements in the struggle and they need to be represented in the top echelons of the leadership.
More importantly, perhaps, it would be in no one’s interest to disband the Syrian army. Outside a few hundreds commanders involved in crimes against humanity, even the officers’ corps could largely be maintained.
The US and allies should encourage the creation of a steering committee to form a provisional government as soon as possible.
The provisional government should establish a timetable for holding elections for a constituent assembly. The best model for elections in Syria would be that used in Iraq after its liberation. Based on proportional representation it would prevent the domination by a single ethnic and/or religious community.
It is also important that Syria adopt a parliamentary system to avoid the mistake made in Afghanistan, where a theoretically powerful president is all but ignored outside his palace. Again, the model developed in Iraq, in which governments depend on multi-ethnic coalitions, might better reflect Syria’s realities.
The Friends of Syria group includes over 100 nations. They should be invited to pledge support for an aid package to revive the Syrian economy and help what one hopes would be a nascent democracy negotiate the difficult years ahead.