Opinion

Iran’s panic = Obama’s opportunity

For the past few months, Iran’s rulers have shown growing signs of panic.

Transformed into pulpits, the state-owned media showcase one mullah after another in a campaign of “stiffening Islamic resistance.” The regime’s various military arms are organizing rival exercises with the claim that the Islamic Republic is “ready for all eventualities.”

Meanwhile, people are selling whatever they can, and emptying their savings, to dump the rial, the national currency, and buy dollars and/or gold.

For his part, “Supreme Guide” Ali Khamenei has broken his tradition of remaining in seclusion to embark on tours of several provinces. Yet his message of “don’t panic” sounds hollower each time.

Observers agree that the Tehran rulers haven’t manifested such panic since 2003, when they believed that the American “Great Satan,” having deposed the despot Saddam Hussein, would turn on them next.

This time, no one fears a US invasion. If anything, the mullahs hope to save themselves by leading the Obama administration down the garden path.

The somber mood in Tehran is prompted by several factors.

The first is deepening divisions within the regime as it prepares for another tricky presidential election in June. Though every such election is stage-managed, none has passed smoothly. The 2009 election provoked uprisings that were crushed with massive brutality.

This time, the regime faces a split: One faction, led by outgoing President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is trying to retain power by fielding a candidate and “arranging” a victory. Its candidate is Esfandiar Rahim Masha’i, a homespun philosopher believed to be Ahmadinejad’s guru. Khamenei loyalists fear that Masha’i plans to push the mullahs out of politics in the name of Iranian nationalism.

The second source of panic is the economic crisis prompted by continued drop in the value of the rial. This has led to mass unemployment and flight of capital on an unprecedented scale.

The regional political landscape is also changing against the regime. The Arab Spring has led to the emergence of new Arab regimes dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood — a Sunni Muslim movement hostile to Shiism, the majority faith in Iran.

Tehran is also near the point of losing its chief Arab ally, Syrian despot Bashar al-Assad, as rebels pursue their thrust into Damascus. And loss of Syria could also mean the end of the Lebanese branch of Hezbollah — and thus the loss to Tehran of an instrument of terror against Israel and the United States.

The Iranian regime is also contemplating the erosion of its influence with Hamas, the group controlling Gaza. In recent weeks, a coalition of Egypt, Jordan, Qatar and Saudi Arabia has persuaded Hamas’ leaders to distance themselves from Tehran.

Last month, Iran’s foreign minister asked to visit Gaza to celebrate what he termed “the success of Fajr 5 missile” supplied by Tehran and used by Hamas against Israel. He got no invitation because Hamas, already promised $400 million by Qatar, feels its bread is buttered more thickly by the oil-rich Arab states than by an Iran whose economy is in free fall.

Tehran is also losing influence in Iraq. One sign is Baghdad’s decision to challenge Iran by fielding a candidate for OPEC secretary-general. Coveting the post, Iran has worked hard to win it with help from Venezuela.

But then Tehran may soon also lose Venezuela, its staunchest ally, as President Hugo Chavez faces yet another round of cancer treatments. The rest of the Chavista establishment has never shared “El Loco’s” enthusiasm for alliance with Tehran.

But the “Great Satan” might ride to the regime’s rescue. President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have hinted at such a possibility by offering “direct and unconditional talks” with Tehran.

Such talks could torpedo negotiations with the 5+1 group (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany). The argument would be to put off 5+1 negotiations, which focus on the nuclear issue, pending the outcome of Iran-US talks.

That, in turn, would mean putting five Security Council resolutions on the backburner for an unknown period — since Tehran could drag talks with America as it’s done under every US administration (except that of George W. Bush) since 1979.

The perception that tension is easing with the United States would immediately boost Iran’s economy, relieving pressure on the rial and slowing the capital haemorrhage.

And, as with previous talks with America, regime factions would close ranks pending the outcome of the high-stakes negotiations.

Obama could put the panic in Tehran to better use. He should throw his weight behind the 5+1 negotiations by making his offer of “direct talks” conditional on success on the nuclear issue, where Iran faces the whole United Nations and not America alone. Talks on bilateral Iran-US issues could start once Tehran has at last complied with the five Security Council resolutions.

The offer of direct talks should be used as an incentive to Iran to stop its defiance of the United Nations. Otherwise, Tehran will see the offer as another sign of US weakness, and be encouraged to continue thumbing its nose at the 5+1.