Opinion

Venezuela crisis: weekend at Hugo’s?

Whether Venezuela’s power crisis materializes by Thursday or later on, it’s coming. America will have a role to play, and better choose the right side this time.

President Hugo Chavez won re-election in October; he’s due to be sworn in the day after tomorrow. But he’s too sick to show up.

Chavez, 58, has ruled the oil-rich country since 1999, promoting his (Simon) Bolivarian revolution — but he hasn’t been seen in public or heard from since his latest cancer-related operation in Cuba.

As far as anyone can tell, he’s still in Cuba, where official word has him in “delicate” but stable condition.

In lieu of verifiable data, the Caracas rumor mill is rife with near-death rumors — not to mention stories contending that the man is already up there, in the great Bolivarian playground in the sky.

Anyway, the country’s remaining leaders have all but announced that he’s unlikely to show up to his re-inauguration ceremony.

Which may turn into a major constitutional crisis.

Under the Venezuelan constitution, if an elected president is incapacitated and can’t take office on the Jan. 10 swear-in date, the National Assembly chief assumes temporary powers. He then must call a new presidential election within 30 days.

Here’s where things get a bit messy.

Before he was rushed off to Havana, Chavez named his deputy, Nicolas Maduro, as his successor. But Maduro, a former bus driver who came up the ranks along with an ambitious Evita Peron-like wife, Cilia Flores, lacks the political skills, charisma and ruthlessness of his boss.

In fact, Maduro’s strongest asset, for now, is his tie, cultivated during a stint as foreign minister, with Venezuela’s real puppet masters: Cuba’s Castro brothers. (Maduro also has ins with other Chavistas across Latin America, as well as with the Iranians.)

But if there’s a new election, it’s not at all clear that Maduro can beat opposition leader Henrique Capriles — who in October won more votes than anyone who’d ever run against Chavez.

In fact, it’s not even clear how long Maduro can control Chavez’s ruling party. He must contend, for example, with Diosdado Cabello, the National Assembly president re-elected to that job just last week, whom many believe has his own eyes on the presidency. (Cabello is a former general and loyal Chavez hatchet man).

Can the Chavistas hang together, let alone hold power, without Chavez?

The solution, apparently cooked up in Havana recently, is straight out of “Weekend at Bernie’s”: Prop up the cadaver and pretend Hugo’s coming back — just not quite yet.

Chavez “remains in power and will be sworn in whenever possible,” heir-apparent Maduro told a government-controlled TV channel Sunday. Echoed Cabello: “Chavez was re-elected and will continue being president beyond Jan. 10.”

And the hell with all that constitutional mumbo-jumbo. After all, the nation’s Supreme Court, which would need to decide the matter, is stacked with party loyalists.

Meanwhile, the opposition isn’t yet eager to use a “technicality” to challenge the power structure. Capriles wants to unshackle Venezuela from the Chavistas’ economically destructive hold. But he fears that moving in too quickly to exploit Chavez’s absence would leave him seeming to take advantage of a health crisis. So he’s unlikely to rock the boat for now.

But unless the strongman truly recovers, sooner or later the weekend will be over — and then a constitutional crisis will erupt. What will America do?

In 2009, Honduran President Manuel Zelaya, a Chavez ally, tried to keep power despite constitutionally imposed term limits. The very independent Honduran Supreme Court joined the legislature and the military to resist the power grab — and show Zelaya the door.

But the Obama administration sawthe unseating of a Constitution-violator as nothing but a “military coup,” and joined a chorus of Chavez allies calling to reinstate Zelaya.

Let’s hope that when Venezuela’s constitutional drama unfolds, Washington will be smarter about picking sides. The imminent departure of “El Loco” could ease hostility toward the United States in Latin America and beyond.

Maybe this time we’ll back our would-be allies for a change.