Opinion

A BLIND EYE ON IRAN’S NUKES

MUHAMMAD El Baradei could make the differ ence between war and peace later this week, with his latest report on Iran’s nuclear program.

El Baradei, the Egyptian director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, must answer a key question: Has Iran complied with the two resolutions passed by the UN Security Council?

If his answer is yes, the Security Council could pass a resolution confirming Iran’s compliance and initiating talks to build on the positive development.

What if Baradei reports that the Islamic Republic is still defying the two resolutions? The council, having fixed a two-month ultimatum, would have to consider tougher measures, even military action.

The common assumption in Western political circles is that the Bush administration would like nothing better than a legal cover for military action against Iran – such as a report that clearly says Iran is defying the UN resolutions.

That consideration might persuade Baradei to avoid giving a clear answer. He isn’t as concerned about Iran’s building a nuclear arsenal as American and European leaders, who would have to deal with a dangerous adversary that could use the ultimate weapon against them.

Baradei assumes that, were Iran to do big mischief, the Americans would deal with it regardless of what the IAEA says. And if it doesn’t, Baradei can spend his retirement on the lecture circuit bragging about his success in preventing another Middle East war.

So the IAEA director may see no reason to anger Iran and risk being targeted by “martyrdom-loving” fanatics by exposing the mullahs’ mendacity.

But, by refusing to expose the Islamic Republic’s violation of the UN resolutions, Baradei would encourage Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in his delusion that Tehran has won – and thus need offer no concessions on the nuclear issue.

Ahmadinejad hammered that point home in his talks in Tehran last week with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

When Lavrov told the Iranians that they had to do something fast in order to avoid new UN sanctions, the mullahs came back with the claim that Iran expects a “good report” from Baradei.

“Why should we do anything when the IAEA admits that we have broken no rules?” Ahmadinejad asked Lavrov, according to sources in Tehran.

The nuclear dispute has been transformed into a key issue of Iran’s domestic politics. Ahmadinejad claims that his rivals (including two of his predecessors as president, Hashemi Rafsanjani and Muhammad Khatami) “betrayed the revolution” by agreeing to scale down Iran’s nuclear program and suspend uranium enrichment.

“The more concessions we give to the Great Satan, the hungrier it becomes for more,” Ahmadinejad said in a speech last Sunday. “Those who press us to climb down [on the nuclear issue] are traitors whom we shall expose.” He further insists that offering any concession would, in itself, amount to an admission of guilt. Those arguments resonate well with the regime’s radical base.

He says that the Islamic Republic wants to join the club of the seven nations capable of enriching uranium, now that “the world is moving toward massive use of nuclear energy.”

“There is no reason why we should become dependent on the seven . . . when we have both the natural resources and the technology to satisfy domestic demand and even have some exports.”

What Ahmadinejad didn’t say, but implied, is even more important. He claims that the Islamic Republic should consider offering concessions only if, and when, it has no other choice. For the time being, however, he thinks that the Islamic Republic has won by confusing the issue, dividing the big powers and engaging the IAEA in a cynical tango.

“Why should we offer preemptive surrender when the threat of preemptive war against us is nonexistent?” demands Hassan Abbasi, the president’s strategic guru.

This brings us back to Baradei’s report.

Back in 2002, Baradei’s ambiguous reports on Iraq’s nuclear program encouraged Saddam Hussein in his defiance of 18 UN resolutions. Had Baradei and his boss at the time, Hans Blix, come out with a clear statement that Iraq didn’t possess any WMDs, they might have made it impossible for the US-led coalition to invade Iraq.

On the other hand, had they reported that Saddam should take measures to prove that he had dismantled his arsenal of nuclear and other WMDs (and also removed the structures that could rebuild them at short notice), they might have persuaded the despot to take the threat of war seriously and transfer power to a caretaker administration in Baghdad.

In either case, a clear position from the UN inspectors might have prevented war.

But Baradei and Blix chose the worst option: They equivocated, thus encouraging Saddam in his defiance while leaving America and its allies no option but war to enforce the UN resolutions.

Baradei shouldn’t repeat the same mistake on Iran.

His report should debunk Ahmadinejad’s claims by stating unequivocally that Iran has violated the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty on 32 issues over more than 18 years.

He should also expose Ahmadinejad’s bogus claim that Iran is enriching uranium as fuel for power stations. Iran has no nuclear power plants and thus has no need of enriched uranium. The only nuclear plant under construction is to be completed by Russians at an unspecified date. But the uranium enriched by Iran at Natanz isn’t suitable for that plant, which needs a specific type of fuel – the specifications for which Moscow has refused to give to Tehran.

Because nuclear fuel has a lifespan of three to four years, the Natanz uranium can’t be intended for any of the 22 nuclear power plants that Ahmadinejad says he wants to build in Iran over the next 25 years. If told that the centrifuges are working to train Iranian scientists, Baradei should know that, at the level of scientific research, Iran already could enrich uranium in 1978.

The centrifuges working at Natanz can only be producing ingredients for nuclear warheads. Baradei should tell that truth to the Iranian people and the world at large.