Almost exactly a year ago, President Obama warned the use of chemical weapons was a red line President Bashar al-Assad should not cross. Six months after the warning, Assad did just that, thumbing his nose at Obama. Since then, Assad crossed Obama’s red line five more times, killing thousands of women and children.
Until this week, Obama’s strategy was to dance around the issue. First, he was not sure that chemical weapons had been used. Then he admitted that they had been but insisted he did not know who had used them. He then conceded that Assad might have been the culprit. And, yet, he demanded evidence. When he did get evidence, however, Obama started talking of his need for “hard evidence.”
It now seems that Obama has enough “hard evidence” to persuade him to get off the fence he has been sitting on since the Syrian tragedy began 30 months ago. The problem is that he may get off one fence only to quickly sit on another. That Obama is beset by tergiversation is indicated by the fact that he has kept a low profile, allowing aides, including Vice President Joe Biden and Secretary of State John Kerry, to indulge in declamatory outbursts. If Obama orders any kind of military action it would be in response to the “something-must-be-done” chorus and not on the basis of any credible strategy to impact the most deadly civil war the Middle East has witnessed in centuries.
Obama is expert in grand statements that are quickly forgotten. More than two months ago, he made much of his decision to arm Syrian rebels. By the time of this writing, the rebels had received nothing. Worse still, US Arab allies, notably Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have slowed down arms shipments to rebels because they were pressed by Kerry to do so to win Russian support for another Geneva conference on Syria.
Biden and Kerry have hinted that any action would be a limited response to Assad’s use of chemical weapons and not aimed at regime change. That is, if Assad continues to kill Syrians with weapons other than chemical ones, he could continue unhindered. According to UN estimates, since the conflict started some 4,000 Syrians have died every month.
There are two ways the US might help shape the outcome of the struggle for Syria.
The first is to train and arm the rebels with the help of regional and European allies while protecting the refugee centers against attacks by Assad and Lebanese Hezbollah mercenaries. The second is to use US and allied firepower to degrade Assad’s war machine, accelerating the victory of the rebels. That would require a greater military commitment with setting up no-fly zones and creating safe havens within Syria itself. Both options require a clear moral and political commitment to regime change. The message would be clear: Regardless of whether he kills people with ordinary weapons or deadly chemicals, Assad must go.
I am not sure Obama wants or can adopt such a commitment. Like love, war requires total and passionate commitment. A reluctant warrior is more of a danger to himself and his friends than to real or imagined adversaries. Saying that Obama is no war leader is not meant to belittle the man. Obama is an astute politician in the American context.
But he demonstrated his ineptitude as a war leader in Afghanistan and Libya. In Afghanistan, his “right war” as opposed to the “wrong war” in Iraq, he sabotaged his “surge” by fixing a date for the withdrawal of forces deployed. All the Taliban had to do was to sit back and wait for that date before resuming their deadly campaign to prevent Afghanis from securing a better life. In Libya the US ended up as loser on all accounts and exposed as an irresolute power that cannot even protect its diplomats.
As long as Obama is commander in chief the US is unlikely to go beyond “lite” intervention. Even then, “lite” intervention could have its uses. It could help destroy Assad’s chemical capacities, depriving the tyrant of a tool of terror. “Lite” intervention could also open the way of a formal indictment against Assad. The use of chemical weapons has been outlawed by international treaties since 1925. Assad and his associates could face charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
“Lite” intervention is more of a semiological rather than a military move. Nevertheless, signaling that Assad’s crimes could provoke a response might dishearten the tyrant’s supporters and encourage his opponents.