Opinion

Netanyahu’s gamble at home

For a brief moment, it appeared that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu escaped from the recent mini-crisis with the United States while protecting two core interests.

First, Netanyahu’s government coalition emerged intact, despite the fact that the controversy was precipitated by an announcement made by the Shas party-controlled Ministry of Interior. It was a timing mistake, claimed Interior Minister Eli Yishai; no one was fired, no one was disciplined and Shas suffered no consequences for the embarrassment it caused to Israel.

Netanyahu also did not compromise on his ideological claim to Jerusalem as Israel’s “undivided and eternal capital.” Both in his apology to Vice President Joseph Biden and subsequently in public statements in Israel and at the AIPAC conference, Netanyahu emphasized Israel’s claim to Jerusalem and denied any intention to negotiate with Palestinians over the future of the city.

But the crisis is not over, and it is too early for Netanyahu to celebrate a diplomatic escape act. Another battle is brewing over new housing at the Shepherd’s Hotel in East Jerusalem; and there are more housing projects in the pipeline in Jerusalem. More importantly, Netanyahu appears unconcerned that his behavior has touched the “third rail” of Israeli politics — namely, public doubts as to whether a prime minister can handle relations with the US.

The weekend press in Israel suggests that Netanyahu thinks he can weather the storm. He has maintained a defiant stance on Jerusalem, apparently buoyed by large crowds of supporters who greeted him upon his return to Israel and bolstered by right-wing coalition partners. Yet there is a real possibility that the Israeli electorate will see his position not as heroic pushback against US demands, but as the actions of a prime minister who simply does not know how to deal with Washington. Netanyahu may win the immediate issue of coalition stability but lose the larger political battle to remain in power.

History is instructive in this regard. In 1975, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin turned down a US-brokered agreement between Egypt and Israel, prompting President Gerald Ford to withhold promised American fighter aircraft and to announce a reassessment of US-Israeli relations. Despite an outpouring of congressional support for Israel, Ford held firm and ultimately Rabin reversed course and agreed to the same deal he had previously declined. Rabin suffered no immediate political repercussions; however, when he returned to the prime minister’s office in 1992, he placed a premium on maintaining very close relations with the American administration.

In 1991, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir clashed with President George H.W. Bush over the question of loan guarantees to help absorb Soviet Jewish immigrants in Israel. The crisis was complex: The US had been instrumental in opening the gates of the Soviet Union to emigrating Jews, and Bush could rightfully claim credit for this achievement. But Shamir would not accede to Bush’s demand that the loan guarantee proceeds not be spent on settlement activity in the occupied territories. Bush was a long-term opponent of settlements; and he was mindful that Secretary of State James A. Baker III was in the midst of putting together the Madrid Conference. Bush did not want settlement activity to complicate those peace efforts. Shamir went to the mat and challenged Bush in Congress. Bush pushed back publicly and won the battle when Congress agreed to defer the issue.

The Israeli public responded to Shamir’s handling of this issue within the year: Shamir was defeated by Rabin in 1992 in an election widely believed as being influenced by the Israeli public’s concern that Shamir could not manage US relations.

So, the question is whether Netanyahu is satisfied to preserve his coalition at the expense of raising questions about his alienating of Israel’s most important supporter. Netanyahu should be concerned, as this crisis has revealed a degree of American determination on the settlements and Jerusalem issues not previously seen.

Can Netanyahu change course? Contrary to conventional wisdom, the prime minister has options. It is true that his current coalition affords Netanyahu several advantages — he is personally situated between the Labor Party to the left and the Yisrael Beitenu party to the right, middle ground that is always coveted by Israeli leaders. But the largest party in Israel, Kadima, is waiting in the wings, and Netanyahu can try to fend off right-wing unhappiness by threatening to reshuffle the coalition. Peace process decisions are not immediately in the offing, and thus the right wing need not take an ideological stance and leave the government now.

Netanyahu has more flexibility than he wants to admit even on the more challenging issue of Jerusalem. In 1967, when Israel captured the Old City and the eastern neighborhoods, the Israeli Knesset enlarged the municipal boundary. Security and planning considerations played a role in determining this new line, but history and religion did not. As such, the assertion of a claim to Jerusalem is abstract, and the actual borders of the city can be adjusted. This affords an Israeli leader — even Netanyahu — flexibility in negotiating the ultimate extent of Israeli sovereignty. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert proved this in 2008 when he reportedly offered Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to divide the city outside the Old City along demographic lines and to turn over the management of the Old City and historic basin to an international consortium.

If he plays his hand astutely, Netanyahu can have it all: He can continue to govern, either with the current coalition or a new coalition; he can remain faithful to the idea of Jerusalem while being flexible on the city’s boundaries; and he can maintain the strong bonds of alliance with the United States that help underpin Israel’s security. Netanyahu’s time of testing is now.

Daniel Kurtzer was the US ambassador to Israel from 2001-05 and holds a chair in Middle East policy studies at Princeton University.