A decade ago, in the euphoric days that followed its liberation, Iraq was supposed to re-emerge as one of the United States’ staunchest regional allies. That didn’t happen, partly thanks to President Obama’s decision to effectively sabotage plans to forge an agreement that would have linked Iraq to the United States in military and security domains.
When Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki visits Washington this week, Obama has a fresh chance to cast a cool look at relations with a nation that could play a central role in the new Middle East emerging from the decade-long turmoil.
Shunned by America and shattered by half a century of tyranny, a weak Iraq had to look for allies.
Surrounded by Sunni-majority nations hostile to a Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad, Iraq was forced to look to Iran.
Yet, with the “Arab Spring” upheaval things started to change in the Middle East.
One major change as far as Iraq is concerned is the decline in Iran’s position as “the rising power,” aiming to fill the vacuum left by the US abdication under Obama. Torn by internecine feuds and pressed by sanctions, the Islamic Republic in Tehran has also been drawn into a costly war in Syria while its Lebanese clients, Hezbollah, are pinned down in the battle to save the doomed regime of Bashar al-Assad. At the same time, Tehran’s arrogant style of intervening in Iraq’s domestic politics has alienated many even among Iraqi Shiites.
One interesting example is Muqtada Sadr, the self-styled Hojat al-Islam (Proof of Islam) who became a player in Iraqi politics thanks to Iranian support. Tehran arranged for Sadr to relocate to the Iranian “holy” city of Qom where he received training as a mullah with plans to make him a full-fledged ayatollah in a few years’ time.
Last month, however, Sadr publicly broke with his Iranian masters, accusing them of “brazen meddling in Iraqi affairs.” Sadr made his move after opening a “positive dialogue” with Saudis — which, in Middle Eastern terms, means getting a fat check to replace funds from Tehran.
Sadr is not alone among Iraqi politicians trying to switch sides.
The entire leadership elite are forced to cast a fresh look at their nation’s regional strategy. Spreading to Iraq, the Syrian civil war is provoking a new round in the conflict between Sunni and Shiite sectarians.
Turkey, the power that could have helped Iraq counter-balance Iran, is angry with Baghdad because of Iraqi opposition to military intervention in Syria. Iraq’s Arab neighbors — Jordan, Kuwait and the Saudis — suspect Maliki of siding with the mullahs in a scheme to create a “Shiite Crescent” from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean.
Maliki comes to Washington as an isolated leader operating from a position of weakness. With no credible regional allies, he can’t play the card of alliance with Tehran because the Khomeinist regime is deeply unpopular among Iraqi Shiites.
For their part, Iraq’s Kurds are busy transforming their autonomous government into the nucleus of a pan-Kurdish “virtual state” to include ethnic Kurds in Syria. Next month, Irbil, the capital of the Iraqi Kurdish region, will host a conference to discuss eventual independence for all Kurds, including those in Turkey, Iran, Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Worse still for Maliki, his ramshackle coalition is falling apart as the 2014 general election looms. Most polls show that, unless something big happens, Maliki is unlikely to win enough seats to lead a new coalition.
Maliki hopes that that “something big” will be a strategic deal with America.
He may be deluding himself; Obama’s confused and intellectually lazy administration may prove incapable of understanding what is happening in the Middle East. The president might be more interested in patching things up with Tehran than in leading America’s allies in a quest for a new architecture of security in the Middle East.
There is another problem: Maliki may be trying to sell Obama a bill of goods. While Maliki certainly resents Iranian interference, there’s no evidence that he is genuinely prepared to switch sides — especially when Washington may end up making a deal with Tehran.
The future of US-Iraqi relations is of strategic importance for both nations. But it is hard to see how two moribund administrations can tackle such a task in the brief time span left them.